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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff believes that the facts are sufficiently 
clear from the court's own findings together with the 
corrections, objections, and additions argued by plaintiff. 
The statement of facts of defendant is not a true picture 
of the testimony of this case since it is written entirely 
from defendant's viewpoint. It also contains editorial 
opinions and conclusions as to why the parties acted as 
they did. 
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Plaintiff Miller would only comment that he 
has maintained throughout the pre-trial discovery, 
the trial and this appeal that Peggy was never sold 
to defendant at any time for any price. The overwhelming 
weight of the evidence supports this contention as explained 
in plaintiff's brief iri chief and this reply brief. The 
actions of plaintiff/ his records, business practices, 
and the testimony of his employees overwhelmingly support 
this contention and cannot be refuted by the "July letter" 
or ambiguous conduct of defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The trial court failed to make any findings 
concerning an essential condition necessary for the 
application of § 70A-2-201(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
As defendant admits in its brief, it is necessary 
for it to come within the exception of § 70A-2-201(2) if 
the alleged oral contract to sell Peggy is to be taken 
from the Statute of Frauds. Since the case was tried to 
the court without a jury, it was required that the court 
should "find the facts specially and state separately 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
its conclusions of law thereon." (Rule 52, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure). The trial court failed to make any 
finding concerning plaintiff's knowledge of the July 
letter contents and this failure requires, at the least, 
a remand to the lower court for further proceedings. 
The court obviously found that plaintiff had 
received the letter and check. If the mere receipt of 
the letter was sufficient to bind a merchant, the words 
"and the party receiving it had reason to know its contents" 
would not have been added to § 201(2). Defendant attempts 
to explain away this requirement by stating, "It is 
inconceivable that anyone receiving that letter would 
not have reason to know the contents thereof." This is 
an interesting observation of defendant but is not a 
finding of the court. The actual physical receipt of 
the letter is not sufficient to bind the receiving 
merchant without knowledge of its contents. To hold other-
wise, as stated in appellant's brief in chief, would make 
unnoticeable, concealed, or camouflaged confirming letters 
bind a receiving merchant to an alleged oral contract even 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
though he had no knowledge of the receipt of the 
document. It would automatically impute binding business 
decisions upon every mail clerk in a corporation regardless 
of other agency rules of law. It would prevent a party 
from being given the opportunity to "accept or reject" the 
terms of the confirming memoranda as to their exactness 
to the original oral contract. 
There is no finding concerning the knowledge of 
plaintiff as to the contents of the letter. Defendant's 
speculation as to what the evidence should show or could 
show is irrelevant since it was incumbent upon the court 
to make a specific finding upon this essential element 
if the Statute of Frauds was to be disregarded. In 
Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Universal CIT Credit 
Corporation, 4 Utah 2d 155, 289 P.2d 1045 (1955), this 
court remanded that case to the trial court for its 
failure to make a specific finding as to the knowledge 
of a bank concerning available funds—the same element 
necessary in this case. 
In addition, the trial court made no findings 
that the actions of Mr. Bowman could be imputed to that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of plaintiff. Defendant cites the evidence in the case 
and concludes, "Clearly, Mr. Bowman is plaintiff's highly 
trusted agent and receipt of the check and letter of July 11, 
1973, by Mr. Bowman must be construed as receipt by Mr. Miller/' 
(Respondent's Brief 16). This assertion by respondent is 
no substitution for an actual finding by the trial court 
when such finding is required to impute even the receipt 
of the letter to plaintiff. The question of agency is 
an important one in cases such as this because of the 
consequences which can occur to the principal for the 
agent's knowledge. As cited in Bender's Uniform 
Commercial Code Service quoted on Page 18 and 19 of 
respondent's brief, "Since the rule of subsection 2 
applies only between merchants, the problems of agency 
are likely to occur, and imputation of an agent's knowledge 
to his principal will be a matter that might also arise 
under this particular criterion," 
Thus, the question of imputation of knowledge 
to plaintiff, either directly or indirectly, is a question 
which cannot be left unanswered by the findings of the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trial court. For this reason, these questions must be 
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings if 
this court fails to grant a new trial or reverse as 
a matter of law on the other contentions raised by 
plaintiff* 
B
» The trial court erred in allowing parol testimony 
of the alleged sale of Peggy on July 8 or 9, 1973, which 
was inconsistent with the written telegram of April 28, 
1973, and the court further erred in making inconsistent 
findings as to the oral agreement prior to the telegram 
and the telegram itself. 
Defendant attempts to separate the April, 1973, 
dealings between the parties from the July, 1973, dealings. 
Defendant states: 
"It is true that, although the parties had 
discussed both purchase and lease of the elephant 
in the preliminary negotiations in April, 1973, 
the contract entered into by the parties contemplated 
only a lease of the elephant. This contract was 
confirmed by telegram . . . . 
"It makes little difference whether the 
parties subsequently modified the lease agree-
ment to convert the same to a sale agreement 
or whether they agreed separately to a contract 
of sale. It has never been contended by the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
defendant that he had an 'option' to purchase 
Peggy Thus, the 'parol' evidence 
received by the court is not an attempted 
modification of the lease agreement of April, 
1973, but is explanatory of the oral contract 
made on or about July 9, 1973, as confirmed 
by the letter of July 11, 1973." 
(Respondent's Brief at 20-21). 
This statement of defendant goes directly against 
Finding No. 6 which states: 
"Both lease and sale of the animal 
were discussed and at the conclusion of the 
discussions, the parties determined that 
defendant would lease Peggy from plaintiff 
for a rental payment of $15 0.00 per week 
for fifteen out of the first twenty weeks 
of the lease and that should defendant 
subsequently determine Peggy to be satisfactory 
for defendant's uses, defendant could purchase 
Peggy and that the lease payments already 
made would be applied toward the purchase 
price." (emphasis added) 
It goes against Finding No. 9: 
"Subsequently, on or about July 8 
or 9, 1973, plaintiff and defendant had a 
telephone conversation wherein defendant 
told plaintiff that defendant considered 
Peggy to be satisfactory and that defendant 
desired to purchase Peggy as previously 
discussed and to apply the lease payments 
already made toward the $5,000.00 purchase 
price." (emphasis added) 
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From these findings, it is evident that the trial 
court considered the July sale to be a continuation of the 
original oral contract made between the parties in April. 
Defendant's assertion that these were two separate occur-
ranees flies directly contrary to the findings of the court 
which were basically prepared by defendant's attorneys. 
Defendant is obviously caught in a dilemma since to support 
the findings of the trial court would bind defendant to 
the April 28, 1973, telegram which "memorialized" the 
April agreement but which made no mention of the option 
to purchase Peggy. (Finding No. 8). 
If the evidence supports two separate agreements, 
as defendant now claims in its brief, the findings are 
clearly erroneous and not based upon the evidence. If, 
on the other hand, the findings are correct as to the 
continuation of the April agreement into July, there is 
an internal inconsistency as to the findings where the 
telegram failed to recognize this option and the testimony 
of the defendants in variance of this telegram should not 
have been allowed. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In either case, it is apparent that the findings 
are either not supported by the evidence or are internally 
inconsistent which cannot justify the judgment of the 
court. 
c#
 The finding of the trial court that a "sale" 
of Peggy had been made by plaintiff. Miller, is clearly 
against the weight of the evidence. 
Defendant complains that some of the errors mentioned 
by the plaintiff in its brief are "not ultimate facts" and, 
therefore, have no meaning. Plaintiff will concede that 
some of these facts are not crucial to the appeal, such 
as whether Peggy was 8 years old or 16 years old. It 
is apparent, however, that the trial court failed to make 
correct findings even on uncontroverted and easily under-
stood facts. It is not hard to understand, therefore, 
why the court failed to correctly find facts on disputed 
matters, such as the receipt of the July letter. 
In addition, defendant contends that plaintiff's 
claimed "omissions" are immaterial and do not go to any 
"ultimate facts necessary to determination of this case." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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It is interesting to note that most of these undisputed 
omissions concern plaintiff's attempt to contact defendant 
about payment. These findings go directly to the trial 
court's conclusion, "It appears strange to the court that 
the plaintiff would allow the elephant in question to 
remain with the defendant for almost a year and then not 
make any move until he received the check for $2,950.00." 
(R. 63) (emphasis added). Certainly these facts are crucial 
in determining the weight of the evidence and the under-
lying reasoning of the trial court. 
While the trier of fact is given broad discretion 
in judging the credibility of witnesses and determining 
facts, this prerogative is not entirely without limit. 
The trier of fact cannot be permitted to capriciously or 
arbitrarily reject credible evidence when there is no 
sound reason for doing so. Super Tire Market, Inc. v. 
Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 P.2d 132 (1966). There is 
no logical or rational basis for failing to make findings 
concerning these uncontroverted events showing plaintiff's 
effort to contact defendant during the period in which the 
trial court stated, "no move" was made. 
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Likewise, the court erroneously equated the 
forgetfulness of plaintiff in remembering the Arkansas 
motel meeting with forgetting the receipt of the alleged 
confirmatory July letter. While defendant in his brief 
characterizes such meeting as "an entire line of discussions 
crucial to the issues at hand" such a characterization is 
entirely misplaced. Mr. Miller's statement, "I have never 
talked to Mr. Kaye in person in Arkansas in my life" is 
a far cry from the inferences made by defendant that 
plaintiff could not recall any conversations concerning 
the leasing of the elephant at any time. It should be 
noted that Mr. Miller voluntarily clarified his lapse 
of memory upon redirect examination. (R. 200). 
Forgetting the place of the conversation is certainly 
no more severe than Mrs. Kaye's forgetfulness of her 
telephone conversation with Mr. King. For the trial court 
to conclude, "It is just as likely that he received a letter 
with a check of July 11 and forgot it or overlooked it as 
it was with his testimony in connection with the meeting 
in Little Rock" (R. 63) is equating apples with boxcars. 
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In the first instance, a particular place and time was 
forgotten; in the second instance, plaintiff would have 
had to forget the sale of the elephant, the total cost, 
the terms of the installment payments, together with the 
fact the balance would not have to be paid for one year* 
See Exhibit Id. In addition, plaintiff would have had 
to have forgotten to tell Mr. Bowman, his accountant, of 
the sale since no changes were made on plaintiff's book 
concerning the status of the elephant. (R. 187-188). 
An examination of the record and of the court's 
own findings of fact supplemented with those omitted by 
the court clearly show that the preponderance of evidence 
is in favor of plaintiff in his contention that no sale 
of Peggy occurred. Since it was defendant's burden of 
proving both an oral contract and an exception to the 
Statute of Frauds, the failure of defendant to do this 
requires reversal as a matter of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
BY:A0MM3^ 
Craig <|/ Cook 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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